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BANKRUPTCY-Usury-Plaintiff's Claim for Compound In-
terest Ruled Usurious; Simple Interest Disallowed to Give
Effect to State's Deterrence Policy. Zoppo v. KAM Realty Trust,
1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1561 (D. Mass. 1975).
In October, 1971, plaintiff advanced a three year $350,000 loan to
KAM Realty Trust, a Massachusetts business trust, and took back
a mortgage as security "with interest on the unpaid balance to be
paid monthly at the rate of fifteen (15) per cent per annum during
said term, but with interest after maturity, default or acceleration
at the rate of one and one-half (11/2) per cent per month for such
time as said principal sum or any part thereof shall remain un-
paid."' Interest payments were met for the first four months. After
a lapse of five months, two additional monthly payments were
made. There were no further payments.!
On April 28, 1975, KAM Realty Trust filed a Chapter XI bank-
ruptcy petition; 3 and on June 6, 1975, plaintiff sought to foreclose
the mortgage.4 Plaintiff's complaint alleged a debt of $350,000 in
principal and accrued interest of $168,104 which included interest
on interest at one and one-half per cent per month from April, 1972,
through May, 1975.1
The debtor-in-possession answered that the interest claimed was
usurious and thus the note was void and the mortgage unenforce-
able.' Accountants for both parties agreed that the accrued interest
and actual interest paid over the forty-three month period averaged
an annual rate of twenty-one to twenty-two per cent.'
The bankruptcy court found the loan usurious,8 but allowed the
creditor's claim for the unpaid principal and permitted him to re-
tain the interest already collected.'
1. Zoppo v. KAM Realty Trust, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1561, 1562 (D. Mass. 1975).
2. Id.
3. Id. A Chapter XI petition consists of arrangements made between a debtor and credi-
tor. 11 U.S.C. § 701-99 (1970). Under this chapter of the Bankruptcy Act, an arrangement
shall consist of "any plan of a debtor for the settlement [or] satisfaction ... of his unsecured
debts." Id. § 706.
4. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 1562.
5. Id. The decision does not indicate the date of default; but since interest is paid for six
months, April, the sixth month of the loan relationship, is regarded as 'the effective date of
default for the purpose of computing the interest on interest claim.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1565.
9. Id.
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The Bankruptcy Act allows the trustee-in-bankruptcy to plead
the defense of usury to a creditor's claim.'" A debtor-in-possession
in a Chapter XI proceeding, who has all the rights and powers of
the trustee," may also assert the defense of usury. There is, however,
no federal usury statute,'" and the Bankruptcy Act defines neither
usury nor its effect.' 3 To resolve the usury issue the bankruptcy
court had to look to the law of the jurisdiction in which the loan
arose. '4
Usury is the charging of interest for the use of money at a rate in
excess of that permitted by statute.'5 The Massachusetts rate of
interest statute, which has been in effect for more than a century,
provides:'8
10. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
11. Id. § 742.
12. Zoppo v. KAM Realty Trust, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1561, 1562 (D. Mass. 1975). The need
for a federal usury law as a means to develop uniformity in this area is expressed in Comment,
A Federal Usury Law-Uniformity at Any Rate, 4 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1971).
13. Zoppo v. KAM Realty Trust, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1561, 1562 (D. Mass. 1975). The only
section in the act dealing directly with an usurious claim is found in Chapter XIII, Section
656(b). It provides:
Before confirming any such plan the court shall require proof from each creditor filing
a claim that such claim is free from usury as defined by the laws of the place where
the debt was contracted.
This requirement was revised by Rule 13-301 of the Bankruptcy Act (1973). This rule provides
that any creditor may be required by the court to establish, by affadavit or in such other
manner as the court may require before the allowance of the claim, that it is free from any
"charge forbidden" by applicable law. The term "charge forbidden" is substituted for
"usury" in order to take account of the varying terminology of small loan laws. Rule 13-301
of the Bankruptcy Act, Advisory Committee's Notes. "Applicable law" is substituted for
"laws of the place where the debt is contracted" in recognition of the fact that the law of a
jurisdiction other than the place where the debt is contracted may sometimes be applicable.
Id.
14. Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1928); Bryant v. Swofford
Bros., 214 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1909). KAMRealty Trust's citation of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), for this proposition seems inappropriate because Erie governs diversity
situations. See Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156,162-63 (1946).
15. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1498, at 677 (1962). The common law of England as
adopted and approved in the United States, has never forbidden the exaction of usury on
loans of money as a matter of general law or public policy. At the present time, usury must
be regarded as merely malum prohibitum, resting entirely upon statutory regulation and
prohibition, and not as malum per se. 45 AM. JUR. 2d Interest and Usury § 4 (1969). Every
state has adopted a usury statute and, as may be expected, there are variations among them.
In some states the entire interest is forfeited, in others only the interest in excess of the
maximum rate is forfeited. For a brief survey of state sanctions, see Comment, Usury in the
Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of The Lex Debitoris, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 123, 232-43 (1967).
16. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 107, § 3 (1975).
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If there is no agreement or provision of law for a different rate, the interest
of money shall be at the rate of six dollars on each hundred for a year, but
.. .it shall be lawful to pay, reserve or contract for any rate of interest or
discount. No greater rate than that before mentioned shall be recovered in a
suit unless the agreement to pay it is in writing.
Under this statute, it has been held that "[plarties may contract
for, receive or pay any amount agreed upon."' 7 The sole caveat is
that a party to an agreement cannot recover an amount greater than
six percent per annum unless the agreement is in writing." When
there is such a writing, it controls and the statutory rate is inapplic-
able. 9 Because of this rule, Massachusetts was considered, at least
until the passage of its criminal usury law in 1970, a "no maximum
[interest] rate" jurisdiction. 0
The Massachusetts criminal usury statute2' provides that anyone
who knowingly contracts for or receives, directly or indirectly, inter-
est in excess of twenty per cent per annum shall be guilty of criminal
usury. 2 Since the statute also provides that any loan at a proscribed
interest rate may be declared void, 3 it is arguable that the twenty
per cent figure was intended as Massachusetts' ceiling for interest
rates. Nevertheless, two subdivisions of the statute suggest a con-
trary conclusion. First, under subdivision (d), one may avoid the
statute by notifying the attorney general of his intent to exceed the
twenty percent maximum.2" Second, subdivision (e) provides:
17. Foley v. Flaherty, 278 Mass. 134, 137, 179 N.E. 599, 600 (1932).
18. Id.
19. Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v. Penn-Simon Const. Co., 357 Mass. 653, 658, 260 N.E.2d
182, 185-86 (1970); Foley v. Flaherty, 278 Mass. 134, 137, 179 N.E. 599, 600 (1932). In
West Side Motor Express, Inc. v. Finance Discount Corp., 340 Mass. 669, 165 N.E.2d 903
(1960) this rule was held to govern a loan of $15,000 where the interest charged was found to
exceed 12 percent per annum. Id. at 671, 165 N.E.2d at 904.
20. Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of The Lex Debitoris, 55 Calif.
L. Rev. 123, 225 n.524 (1967).
21. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49 (Supp. 1974).
22. Id. § 49(a). Under this provision, a person found guilty shall be punished by imprison-
ment for not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or both.
Id.
23. Id. § 49(c).
24. This was the basic premise behind the court's decision in this case. Zoppo v. KAM
Realty Trust, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1561, 1564-65 (D. Mass. 1975).
25. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49(d) (Supp. 1974). This provision for notice to the
attorney general might generate problems of self incrimination similar to those related to the
federal occupational tax on wagering. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4401-13 (1970). See also Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
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"The provisions of this section shall not apply to any loan the rate
of interest for which is regulated under any other provision of gen-
eral or special law ... ."6 Since the criminal statute contains a
scienter requirement27 and there has been no repeal or modification
of the earlier rate of interest statute," it would seem that the crimi-
nal provisions simply describe a particular crime and are not in-
tended to establish a maximum interest rate for Massachusetts.
In finding the contract usurious, the court focused upon the plain-
tiffs compound interest demand." Such claims for interest upon
interest have long been regarded with disfavor in Massachusetts."
This view evolved from an ancient series of decisions considering the
merits of compound interest computation. In an early case involving
notes payable after a term of years with annual interest, it was
decided that judgment for only simple interest could be recovered.',
Plaintiff had argued that by the terms of the note he was entitled
to have the interest due at the end of the first year added to the
principal, and to apply the interest rate to the aggregate at the end
of the second year, and so on from year to year.2 The court disa-
greed, reasoning that plaintiff had waived any claim to compound
interest33 by failing to bring an action at the expiration of each year.
The principle was extended when the court refused to enforce an
express promise to pay compound interest if the makers of the notes
failed to make annual interest payments.34 Another decision
26. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49(e) (Supp. 1974).
27. Id. § 49(a). It states: "Whoever in exchange for either a loan of money or other
property knowingly contracts for, charges, takes or receives, directly or indirectly, interest
and expenses. . . greater than twenty per centum per annum . . . shall be guilty of criminal
usury . . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
28. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 107, § 3 (1975).
29. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 1562.
30. See Shapiro v. Bailen, 293 Mass. 121, 199 N.E. 315 (1936); Inhabitants of Tisbury v.
Vineyard Haven Water Co., 193 Mass. 196, 79 N.E. 256 (1906); Lewin v. Folsom, 171 Mass.
188, 50 N.E. 523 (1898); Hodgkins v. Price, 141 Mass. 162, 5 N.E. 502 (1886).
31. Hastings v. Wiswall, 8 Mass. 455, 456 (1812).
32. Id. at 455.
33. Id. at 455-56.
34. Henry v. Flagg, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 64 (1847). But cf. De Cordova v. Weeks, 246 Mass.
100, 140 N.E. 269 (1923), where the court held that an agreement for quarterly interests at
18 percent per year to be compounded at maturity meant that the unpaid interest should
be added to the outstanding principal only at maturity of the loan. Thereafter, interest on




awarded interest as part of damages for wrongful ejectment, but
refused to compute the interest on a compounded basis declaring
that "[i]t has been repeatedly held in this Commonwealth that it
is against the policy of the law to allow compound interest. .. ."I
In light of Massachusetts' policy against compounding interest,
the court in Zoppo v. KAM Realty Trust3" held that plaintiff's de-
mand for such interest was usurious7.3 Plaintiff's claim for the over-
due principal was granted because to void the note would unjustly
enrich the debtor-in-possession's other creditors who received the
benefit of the entire $350,000 loan. 8 Plaintiff was also permitted to
retain the interest already collected since, at fifteen percent, it was
paid at a lawful rate and the loan agreement was not usurious on
its face.39 However, interest from the date of default was denied in
order to advance the policy of deterrence the court found implicit
in Massachusetts' usury law.4" Summarizing eloquently, the court
announced: "[In fairness to all, he who seeks to overreach may
recover the seed but puts at risk not just a few extra petals but the
entire flower.""
Apparently, the court made its usury finding solely on the basis
of the criminal statute and the certified public accountants' testi-
mony that the agreement would produce interest at a rate greater
than twenty percent.' It neglected, however, to examine subdivi-
35. Hodgkins v. Price, 141 Mass. 162, 164, 5 N.E. 502, 504 (1886). But cf. Ellis v. Sullivan,
241 Mass. 60, 134 N.E. 695 (1922) where the court stated:
It has long been settled that interest on interest cannot be recovered, although pay-
ment has been demanded, because of 'the ancient unwillingness to allow compound
interest.'. . . While this is the general rule, it is not always followed. In equity interest
may be compounded and in the discretion of the court may be allowed where it is
necessary for the purpose of affording a just and equitable accounting, particularly
where the person charged with its payment is seeking the aid of the court.
Id. at 64, 134 N.E. at 697 (citations omitted).
36. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1561 (D. Mass. 1975).
37. Id. at 1565.
38. Id. Some bankruptcy courts place a higher burden on the creditor to establish that
his claim is free from the taint of usury than did this court. This is especially true in a Chapter
XIII proceeding involving a usurious claim. See In re Williams, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1567, 1568-
70 (D. Ala. 1975).
39. 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 1565.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. One of the elements which the court never examined was the intent of the lender
to violate or evade the maximum rate of interest. This element is one of the essential factors
in determining whether usury exists. See Interstate Financial Corp. v. Appel, 1 Bankr. Ct.
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sion (e) of the criminal usury law which would have compelled a
consideration of the applicability of the rate of interest statute. The
court thus avoided a difficult determination. No reported Massa-
chusetts decision has resolved the conflict between the criminal
usury statute's provision for voiding an usurious agreement and the
rate of interest statute's broad language allowing any written,
agreed upon interest rate.
Had the plaintiff sued for payment of the debt in a Massachusetts
court, that court might have found it unnecessary to resolve the
conflict. The original fifteen percent interest rate cannot be re-
garded as usurious. 3 Since Massachusetts does not permit com-
pounding interest," the default rate of one and one-half per cent per
month could only have been interpreted as a simple interest provi-
sion for eighteen per cent per year. 5 Thus, there would have been
no need to consider the criminal usury statute.4
The loan agreement in KAM Realty Trust is not usurious under
Massachusetts law. 7 Only the plaintiffs claim, which interpreted
the default clause as a compound interest provision, raises the possi-
bility of usury." The worst fate plaintiffs claim would have suffered
in Massachusetts is the disallowance of the compound interest
demand. Generally, however, Massachusetts courts convert the as-
serted compound interest into simple interest," which, in KAM
Dec. 1429, 1430 (D. Ga. 1975).
43. Cf. Manganaro Drywall, Inc. v. Penn-Simon Const. Co., 357 Mass. 653, 658, 260
N.E.2d 182, 185-86 (1970); Foley v. Flaherty, 278 Mass. 134, 137, 179 N.E. 599, 600 (1932).
44. See note 35 supra.
45. Henry v. Flagg, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 64 (1847); Hastings v. Wiswall 58 Mass. 455 (1812).
46. Furthermore, section 3 of chapter 107 expressly excludes from its scope several sec-
tions of chapter 140 dealing with small business loans and consumer credit. Thus under the
statutory construction maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius section 3 of chapter 107
should govern this case.
47. Even if the case were prosecuted under the criminal usury statute this would be
arguably so. The only rate knowingly contracted for was fifteen percent. The creditor lacked
the requisite intent as to the default clause, even if he intended it to be compounded, because
he could not have known if, nor for how long, the debtor would have defaulted. Nor could
the creditor be guilty of having knowingly received interest at a rate greater than twenty per-
cent since he received only $85,500 over the three year term of the loan. This figure would
represent interest at a rate of approximately eight percent per annum, well within the twenty
percent maximum.
48. "The problem [usury] develops only after the default and the start of the foreclosure
action." 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 1565.
49. Henry v. Flagg, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 64 (1847); cf. Foley v. Flaherty, 278 Mass. 134,
179 N.E. 599 (1932); De Cordova v. Weeks, 246 Mass. 100, 140 N.E. 169 (1923).
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Realty Trust, would have resulted in an award of interest at eigh-
teen percent.
The bankruptcy court's denial of simple interest on a theory of
deterrence is, ironically in a bankruptcy action,50 inequitable. Who
is to be deterred? The bankruptcy court does not speak for Massa-
chusetts and thus deters none of its creditors. It only addresses the
creditors-to-be of future debtors-in-possession. To proclaim a de-
terrence policy at this stage in the creditor-debtor relationship
seems odd since the creditors at this point are the victims of their
debtor's insolvency.
5 1
While the validity and construction of a creditor's claim are ap-
propriately determined by application of Massachusetts law,52 the
enforcement of a valid claim is a federal question governed by equi-
table considerations peculiar to bankruptcy law. 53 The court cor-
rectly declined to allow the interest on interest demand as contrary
to Massachusetts law.54 However, had the court recognized the va-
lidity of the plaintiff's simple interest claim, it could have pro-
ceeded to the enforcement issue without struggling with the deter-
rence policy so "ambivalently" expressed in Massachusetts' crimi-
nal usury statute. Enforcement of plaintiff's simple interest claim
would have required the court to balance the equities among the
creditors, or between the creditors and the debtor-in-possession.55
Specifically, the court would have had to address two further ques-
50. A bankruptcy court is a court of equity. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)
(1970); see Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966). Furthermore, § 2(a)(15) of the
Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15), provides a bankruptcy court may
[m]ake such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in addition to
those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provi-
sions of this title ....
Hence, a bankruptcy court is vested with broad equitable powers.
51. Furthermore, the history of Massachusetts usury law-more appropriately the lack of
it-is not one of deterrence. Massachusetts has long been a fortress protecting the policy of
freedom of contract, limiting that freedom only with the common law doctrines of good faith,
unconscionability, and overreaching. Marvin v. Mandell, 125 Mass. 562 (1878). When interest
has been voluntarily and in good faith paid and received at a rate unenforceable under the
statute, Massachusetts has refused to permit the payor to recover the excess. Id. at 564.
52. Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1928); Bryant v. Swofford
Bros., 214 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1909).
53. See Vanson Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162-63 (1946).
54. See note 35 supra. Arguably a valid interest on interest provision is inenforceable as
a matter of bankruptcy law. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156,
165 (1946).
55. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 165 (1946).
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tions; first, did the unpaid interest become due before or after the
beginning of the bankruptcy proceedings, and second, would the
disposition of the security produce money for the payment of both
the principal and the interest due. If simple interest accrues after
the bankruptcy petition has been filed, a secured creditor's claim
for that interest is denied unless the secured property's value is more
than the sum of the principle and the interest earned." To allow the
secured creditor such interest where the security is worth less than
the amount of the debt would be inequitable to the unsecured credi-
tors. 7 However, where the debtor's assets are sufficient to pay all
the creditors, equity allows the payment of the additional interest
to the secured creditors." By denying plaintiff's interest claim on
the basis of a deterrence theory, the court avoided a decision as to
the value of plaintiffs security.
The conflict among the state jurisdictions as to the effect given
to an usurious loan obscures bankruptcy's traditional distinction
between the allowance and the enforcement of a claim. However,
since plaintiff's simple interest claim is valid in Massachusetts, the
bankruptcy court should have allowed the claim and relied on well
settled bankruptcy principles to decide the enforcement issue. By
relying on an unconstrued and unenforced criminal usury statute to
invoke a local deterrence policy, the court deprived a good faith
lender of the proper determination of his ratable share in the bank-
ruptcy distribution.
Gerald Bohm
56. Id. at 164.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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